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GROUND WATER MINING LAW AND POLICY*

In 1975 irrigation accounted for eighty-three percent of the
fresh water consumption in the United States,l and ninety-one per.~
the major
cent of fresh water consumption in the W e ~ t Although
source of irrigation water traditionally has been surface water, the
use of ground water for irrigation has increased dramatically.
Ground water constituted thirty-eight percent of the water used for
irrigation in the West in 1975, compared with twenty-one percent in
1955. During the same period, the quantity of ground water used for
irrigation in the West increased from eighteen million acre feets
(maf) to fifty-six maf.
This increase in ground water use for irrigation has led to
ground water mining in several western states, notably California,
Texas, Nebraska, Arizona, and Kansas. Ground water mining or depletion occurs when withdrawals from an aquifer, a ground water
formation, exceed net recharge. As ground water depletion occurs,
the cost of pumping water from greater depths will increase. Wells
will have to be deepened or replaced to continue yielding water. If
ground water feeds streams, their baseflow will be reduced. Ground
water pumping costs gradually will become so high that irrigators
will be unable to afford full irrigation and will curtail withdrawals to
reduce costs. Irrigation ultimately will be so expensive that it will be
Published as Paper No. 6708, Journal Series, Nebraska Agricultural Experiment
Station. Preparation of this article was supported by the Office of Water Research and
Technology project 14-34-0001-8412, United States Department of the Interior, Washington,
D.C. as authorized by the Water Resources Research and Development Act of 1978.
1. The source for the water use statistics in this section are C. MURRAY
& E. REEVES,
IN 1975 24-25 (United States Geol. Survey
ESTIMATED
USE OF WATERI N THE UNITEDSTATES
Cir. NO. 765, 1977) and K. MACKICHAN,ESTIMATEDUSE OF WATERI N THE UNITEDSTATES,
1955 6-9 (U.S. Geol. Survey Cir. No. 398, 1957).
2. As used in this article the "West" refers to the seventeen contiguous western states
that follow the doctrine of prior appropriation to some extent in allocating rights to use surface
or ground water, including: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, NG
braska, Nevada, New Mexiw, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota. Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
3. An acre foot is 325,851 gallons, enough water to cover an acre of land one foot dcep.
An acre foot of water would supply a family of five for one year and would irrigate a half acre
of corn in most areas of Nebraska.
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abandoned4 unless a supplemental source of water is obtained. When
ground water irrigation is abandoned in this way economic depletion
of the aquifer has occurred.
As the National Water Commission observed, ground water
mining "is not inherently wrongeHbEconomic and associated social
problems will occur, however, when ground water is mined without
considering its future value. If ground water aquifers or reservoirs
were not hydrologically interconnected with streams, were owned or
controlled by a single entity, and did not generate regional economic
activity, the decison to mine or not could be left to the owner.6 Presumably the decision to mine or not would be based on balancing the
economic benefits from present use with the anticipated economic
benefits from future use.7 Ground water reservoirs, however, are
often significantly hydrologically interrelated with streams, are
rarely in a single ownership, and often generate regional economic
a c t i ~ i t yDecisions
.~
about ground water mining do not affect only the
overlying landowners, but also surface water users and regional
economies benefiting from irrigated agricultural production. Irrigation historically has played an important role in stabilizing agricultural production and the associated regional economics during
drought periods. The public impacts of ground water use create a
tension between private incentives to mine ground water and public
incentives to stabilize its use.
Ground water is a common pool resource, one for which the
right to use (typically without charge) is shared with others.@Usually there is no significant ceiling on the amount each user may
take.1° Because the resource is not priced, there is no private incentive for any user to reduce current consumption to have more available for the future," Any user who does so runs the risk that another
user will take the resource for present use.la There is no private incentive to save for tomorrow, even if there is general agreement that
4. This occurred in southern Texas when interstate price controls on natural gas were
lifted. Irrigators, using what in effect was price controlled natural gas to power irrigation
pumps, could not afford to continue irrigation when the price of natural gas increased
dramatically.
5 . NATIONAL
WATERCOMMISSION,
WATERPOLIC~ES
FOR THE FUTURE 239 (1973).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9 . Id.
10. Id.
1 1 . Id.
1 2 . Id. at 239-40.
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the future value of the resource is greater than the present value.18
Two major social consequences of unregulated development of common pool resources are that (1) the resource is likely to be consumed
at a rate faster than the optimum rate, and (2) local and regional
economies dependent on the resource use will contract as depletion
occurs.14 The first consequence is the basis for state laws regulating
oil and gas production.16 The second consequence, referred to as the
boom and bust syndrome, has been a traditional justification for federally subsidized "rescue projects" designed to import a supplemental water supply to an area mining ground water.
An economic analysis of ground water mining in Oklahoma and
Texas suggests that restrictions on ground water use will lead to
greater economic benefits than would unregulated ground water mining.16 Such restrictions are not widespread in the West, however,
principally because of political opposition from irrigators. Farmers
traditionally have been given a high degree of independence in determining how land and water resources are used in agricultural production. Governmental water use regulations are perceived as limiting this independence. Irrigators have incorrectly assumed that such
regulations necessarily threaten their economic interests. This attitude is probably the single most important factor preventing effective
regulation of ground water mining.
States and the federal government have a common interest in
preventing or controlling ground water mining. States are interested
in managing ground water mining to achieve the greatest sustained
economic benefit from ground water use. The adverse economic impacts of ground water depletion would be greatest at the state and
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Oil and gas are generally considered to be the private property of the overlying landowner. This traditionally has meant that each landowner could withdraw as much of the mineral as he was able to without regard to the effect on other overlying owners. Because this
uncoordinated development would reduce the quantity of oil or gas that could ultimately be
recovered, states have regulated oil and gas production, either by administrative regulation by
a state oil and gas commission, by the authorization of compulsory unitization agreements, or
both. Unitization refers to allocating each overlying landowner a proportionate share of the
profits from oil or gas production regardless of where the producing wells are located. The
necessity of state regulation to achieve the optimum withdrawal of oil and gas at least suggests
that such regulation may be necessary to achieve the optimum withdrawal of ground water.
AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
OF REGULATING
WATER-USE
IN
16. H. MAPP & V. EIDMAN,
THE CENTRAL
OGALALLA
FORMATION
58-63 (Agric. Exp. Stat., Okla. St. U., Technical Bulletin T-141, 1976). The authors concluded that if the amount of groundwater available were
limited, establishing a graduated tax on ground water use would lead to higher net farm income than would unrestricted pumping or restriction of withdrawals.
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local levels. The federal interest in ground water mining is somewhat
different. If economic depletion of a ground water supply is unplanned, irrigators are likely to request the federal government to furnish
a federally subsidized supplemental water supply to sustain an established irrigation-dependent economy which developed on the improvident use of ground water.17 Federal rescue projects have taken the
form of surface water irrigation projects where steamflow is dammed
and transported to the area of need. Rescue projects relieve the
mined area of the responsibility of living within the limits of its natural water supply and also reduce the economic incentives to use
ground water more efficiently by providing a cheaper, subsidized
supplemental water supply.
In most western states, ground water use is subject to some degree of state regulation. Effective regulations to deal with ground
water mining, however, generally have not been established.l8 A politically more popular approach has been to develop a rescue project
to import developed water supplies to augment diminishing ground
water supplies. This has been accomplished in southern California
with federal assistance through the Colorado River Project. Arizona
and Texas are emulating the California experience in attempting to
obtain a federal rescue project to cope with ground water mining
through the Central Arizona Project and the High Plains Study, respectively. Federal provision of a rescue project in effect rewards an
area for its improvident use of ground water, a policy that will
hardly encourage states to develop policies to prevent or control
ground water mining.
This article will examine the physical, economic, and legal effects of ground water mining. Traditional western water law doctrines will be evaluated relative to ground water mining. Regulating
ground water development and use in control areas will be discussed,
WATERCOMMISSION,
supra note 5, at 232. This concern is a legitimate
17. NATIONAL
one. In 1976 Congress authorized the High Plains Study to examine
the depleton of the natural resources of those regions . . presently utilizing the
declining water resources of the Ogaliala aquifer [sic], and to develop plans to
increase water supplies in the area and report thereon to Congress . . . . In formulating these plans, the Secretary [of Commerce] is directed . . . to examine the
feasibility of various alternatives to provide adequale water supplies in the area
. . . to assure the continued economic growth and vitality of the region.
42 U.S.C. 8 1962(d)-18 (1980)(emphasis added). For a discussion of the present status of the
High Plains Study see infra notes 71-78 and the accompanying text.
18. G. SLOGGETT,
MININGTHE OGALLALA
AQUIFER:
STATEA N D LOCALEFFORTSI N
GROUNDWATER
MANAGEMENT
(Agric. Exp. Sta., United States Dep't of Ag. & Okla. St. U.,
Research Report P-761, 1977).

.

19823

GROUND WATER MINING

509

as will development of supplemental water supplies. The appropriateness of federal, state, and local rescue projects will be considered,
particularly regarding under what conditions a taxpayer subsidy
would be justified.

ECONOMIC
AND LEGALEFFECTS
OF GROUND
I. PHYSICAL,
WATERMINING'@
Both surface water (the water in lakes, rivers and streams) and
ground water (the water stored in ground water reservoirs or aquifers) are ultimately derived from precipitation. Rainfall and melting
snow feed streams and lakes as overland runoff. Some precipitation
soaks into the ground, slowly moving laterally until it either drains
into a lake or stream, or percolates downward where it,becomes a
part of a ground water aquifer. The process of ground water storage
in the West is slow because natural recharge is only a few acre inchesaOof water per year. When the storage capacity of an aquifer is
reached, ground water may be discharged into a stream or lake, may
be tapped by the roots of subirrigated plants, or may be evaporated
from lakes and wetlands.a1
This equilibrium condition may be altered by ground water development and use. When ground water withdrawals exceed ground
water recharge the balance comes from ground water stored in the
aquifer. Sustained reductions in ground water storage reduce ground
water discharge and constitute ground water mining. Common effects of ground water mining include: declining ground water levels;
increased pumping lifts and costs; and reduced aquifer discharge to
streams or lakes, subirrigation, or wetlands. A new equilibrium condition may be established because of reduced discharge. In many
19. For a description of the hydrologic cycle and its relation to ground water written for
a general auidence see H. BALDWIN& C. MCGUINNESS,A PRIMERON GROUNDWATER,
(United States Geol. Survey 1963); J. Crosby, A Loyman's Guide to Groundwa~erHydrology
in C. CORKER,
GROUNDWATER
LAW,MANAGEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION
(National Water
Commission Legal Study No. 6, 1971); L. LEOPOLD& W. LANGBEIN,
A PRIMER
ON WATER
(United States Geol. Survey, 1960); Tripp & Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution. T e
ward a Coordinated Strategy to Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARV.ENVTL.L. REV.1,
3-4 (1979).
20. An acre inch is 27,154 gallons of water, enough to cover an acre of land one inch
deep.
21. In some ground water aquifers little or no discharge occurs. In these closed aquifers
water pressure increases as ground water storage occurs. When wells are drilled into these
closed aquifers (called artesian aquifers), the artesian pressure forces the water to rise in the
well. If enough ground water is withdrawn from an artesian aquifer, artesian pressure will
ultimately be reduced to atmospheric pressure. See generally H. BALDWIN& C. MCGUINNESS, SUpM note 19, at 8-10.
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cases, however, an equilibrium may not be reached until withdrawals
are reduced, either from the reduced capacity of an aquifer to yield
water, or from reduced pumping.
Many of the physical effects of ground water mining have practical significance. Ground water pumping during the irrigation season causes temporary, seasonal water level fluctuations that may
lead to well interference conflicts. While ground water levels may
partially or completely recover before the next irrigation season begins, well yields may be impaired during the irrigation season. This
may require the drilling of deeper wells or the installation of more
powerful pumps to maintain ground water supply availability.
The resolution of well interference conflicts is a significant element of western ground water lawsaaAn important component of a
ground watkr right is (1) the extent to which a ground water user is
protected in his original means of diverting ground water (i.e., his
original well and pump) and (2)when shortages occur, how ground
water will be allocated among competing users. When withdrawals
by other ground water users are made, water levels in previously installed wells may decline to the extent that the earlier user's well
and pump stop yielding water. In most cases, the earlier user is able
to restore his ground water supply by drilling a deeper well and installing a more powerful pump. In other cases, ground water supplies
may be temporarily or permanently inadequate to supply all users.
When well capacity is inadequate to continue yielding water but well
yields may be increased by installing new wells or pumps, the legal
issue is whether the earlier user is entitled to compensaton for the
cost of increasing well capacity and higher pumping costs. When the
aquifer is inadequate to supply all users the legal issue is how ground
water will be allocated among competing users.
Western ground water law addresses the well interference conflict issue, although in a variety of ways. The doctrine of prior appropriation is the majority rule in the West,a8 although historically it
22. See Aiken, Nebraska Ground Water Law and Administration, 59 NEB.
L. REV.917,
922-30 (1980).
23. CAL. WATERCODE $4 1200-1201 (West 197l)(however, appropriation is not the
exclusive basis of California ground water law, see Aiken, supra note 22 at 926; COLO.REV.
STAT.
3 37-90-137 (1973 & Supp. 1979) (apparently applying prior appropriation to nontributary ground water outside of designated ground water basins, see 2 W. HUTCHINS,
WESTERN
STATES
(United States Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub.
WATERRIGHTSIN THE NINETEEN
No. 1206, 1974) 704; 3 W. HUTCHINS,
id. at 236); IDAHOCODE$ 42-103 (1977); KAN.STAT.
ANN.$ 82a-703 (1977); MONT.REV.CODESANN.8 89-2916 (Supp. 1977); NEV.REV.STAT.
8 534.020 (1973); N.M. STAT.
ANN.5 75-1 1-1 (1968); N.D. CENT.CODE3 61-01-01 (1960);.
OR. REV. STAT.8 537.525 (1979); S.D.COMP.LAWSANN. 3 46-6-3 (Supp. 1979); UTAH
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was preceded by the common-law overlying-rights doctrines of absolute ownership,a4reasonable use,a6 and correlative rights.
The absolute ownership doctrine reflects the early judicial assumption that ground water movement was unknowable and that
courts therefore had no factual basis upon which to deal with well
interference conflicts. Under the absolute ownership doctrine, the
owner of land overlying a ground water aquifer may withdraw
ground water without regard to the effect it may have on the wells of
other overlying owners. Under the absolute ownership doctrine, earlier users have no legal protection regarding well interference conflicts based on either well inadequacy or aquifer indequacy.
The reasonable use doctrine addresses well interference conflicts
but only to a limited extent. Under the reasonable use doctrine, a
landowner's right to withdraw ground water will be restricted only if
it is wasteful, used on nonoverlying land, or both. Otherwise, the
landowner may withdraw ground water without regard to the effect
on the wells of other overlying owners.
The correlative rights doctrine addresses well interference conflicts in theory by prorating the available supply among ground
water users when shortages occur. In practice, however, the correlative rights doctrine in California is part of the legal basis for integrating the use of ground water and imported surface water supplies,
not a policy for restricting ground water use if well interference conflicts occur.2B Under the correlative rights doctrine, the earlier
ground water user has no legal protection regarding well interference
conflicts based on well inadequacy, but theoretically may obtain judicial relief if well interference is based on aquifer inadequacy.
CODEANN. 8 73-3-1 (1968); WASH.REV.CODEANN. 8 90.44.040 (1962); WYO.STAT.$ 41144 (Supp. 1975).
24. See Vineland Irr. Dist. v. Azusa Irr. Co., 126 Cal. 486, 58 P.1057 (1899); Public
Util. Comm'n v. Natatorium Co., 36 Idaho 287, 21 1 P.533 (1922); Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan.
588 (1 88 1); Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363 (1872); Vanderwork v. Hewes, 15 N.M. 439, 1 10
P.567 (1910); Metcalf v. Nelson, 8 S.D. 87, 65 N.W. 91 1 (1895); Houston & Tex. Cent. R.R.
v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904); Herriman Irr. Co. v. Keel, 25 Utah 96, 69 P.719
(1902); Hunt v. Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 P.137 (1919); TERR.
OKLA.STAT.8 4162 (1890).
25. See Maricopa County Mun. Water Consew. Dist. No. 1 v. Southwest Cotton Co.,
39 Ariz. 65, 4 P.2d 369 (1931); Katz v. Waikinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P.663 (1902), afd on
rehearing, 141 Cal. 137, 74 P.766 (1903); Ryan v. Quinlan, 45 Mont. 521, 124 P.512 (1912);
Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb. 802, 248 N.W. 304 (1933); Volkman v. Crosby, 120
N.W.2d 18 (N.D. 1963); Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937); Bull
v. Siegrist, 169 Or. 180, 126 P.2d 832 (1942); Horne v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 59 Utah 279,
202 P.815 (1921); Evans v. City of Seattle, 182 Wash. 450, 47 P.2d 984 (1935); Binning v.
Miller, 55 Wyo. 451, 102 P.2d 54 (1940).
26. See infra notes 60-62 and the accompanying text.
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Appropriation states vary in their approaches to well interference conflicts, although earlier users, "senior appropriators," generally are entitled to some protection. In theory, conflicts between
ground water appropriators are resolved by requiring a junior appropriator to stop withdrawals when they interfere with those of a senior
appropriatdr. In most states the senior appropriator must enforce his
priority through litigation, although some states authorize administrative enforcement of ground water prioritiesea7Administrative restriction of new appropriations, through well spacing requirements or
withdrawal limitations, may protect senior ground water appropriators when the proposed ground water appropriation might interfere
with existing rights.ae A common approach is to protect reasonable
pumping depths, which does not protect the senior appropriator's initial well and pump, but does limit the extent to which ground water
levels will be allowed to decline.pBThis protects senior appropriators
regarding future ground water level declines but not regarding past
ground water level declines.80
Seasonal well interference conflicts are not necessarily an indication of ground water mining because adequate supplies are often
available by drilling deeper wells or by installing more powerful
pumps. If water levels decline annually as well as seasonally, however, ground water mining is occurring. As water levels decline
pumping costs will increase. This will gradually raise the irrigator's
costs to the point that he will reduce his ground water withdrawals,
improve his irrigation efficiency, grow crops using less water, or reduce his irrigated acreage. These changes in irrigation practices will
occur gradually because depletion of ground water supplies generally
27. MONT. REV.CODESANN. 8 89-2932 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT.534.110(6)
(1973); OR. REV.STAT.8 537. 775 (1979); S.D. COMP.LAWSANN. 5 46-6.2 (Supp. 1979);
WASH.REV. CODEANN. $ 90.44.130, .I80 (1967); WYO. STAT.8 41-132 (Supp. 1975)(in
control areas only).
28. COLO. REV.STAT. 37-90-137 (Supp. 1979)(applies only to appropriation of nontributary ground water outside of designated ground water basins); MONT.REV.CODEANN. 8
89-2918 (Supp. 1977) (in control areas only); Nev. REV.STAT.$ 534.110(7)(1973)(in designated basins only); N.M.STAT.ANN.8 73-1 1-3 (Supp. 1975)(Senior appropriators must tolerate some ground water level reduction, Mathers v. Texaco, Inc., 77 N.M.239, 421 P.2d 771
(1967)); OR.REV,STAT.
$8 537.620(3), .620(4), .622 (1979); S.D. COMP.LAWSANN.5 46-67 (1967); WASH.REV.CODEANN. $5 99.44.030, .090 (1962); WYO. STAT.
5 41-140 (Supp.
1975)(in control areas only).
29. IDAHOCODE8 42-226 (1977); NEV.REV.STAT.$8 534.1 10(3), .110(4)(1973); S.D.
COMP.LAWSANN. 5 46-6-6.1 (Supp. 1979); WASH.REV.CODEANN. § 90-44.070 (1962);
WYO.STAT.8 41-141 (Supp. 1975).
30. Conflicts between surface and ground water users typically are resolved on the same
basis as well interference conflicts. See Aiken, supra note 22, at 936-40.
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occurs over decades. Similarly, the reduction in economic activity associated with the transition back to dryland agriculture will occur
over a period of decades. Local and state economies will not experience a sharp decline, but will slowly change as irrigation is gradually
reduced.
The major policy issue related to ground water mining is
whether the inevitable consequences of mining should be postponed
by regulation. If supplemental water supplies are not developed, reduced irrigation is the inevitable consequence of ground water mining. If irrigators will be forced by higher pumping costs to use improved irrigation methods, should regulations be established to
accomplish that same result sooner? The advantage of doing so is
that ground water supplies last longer than they would otherwise.
The disadvantage is that irrigators incur higher costs sooner than
they would if ground water use were governed only by the private
costs and benefits of irrigation. The public cost of administering
ground water regulations is an additional factor. The ultimate issue
is whether current economic benefits should be forgone to sustain
future economic benefits.
The ground water mining issue is not directly addressed by
traditional western ground water law doctrine^.^' The absolute ownership and reasonable use doctrines permit ground water withdrawals to occur without regard to whether mining is occurring. Under
the absolute ownership doctrine ground water withdrawals may be
enjoined only if they are m a l i c i o ~ s Under
. ~ ~ the reasonable use doctrine a landowner's right to withdraw ground water may be enjoined
only if it is wasteful, used on nonoverlying land, or both. The correlative rights doctrine addresses ground water mining in theory by
prorating the "safe yield" of an aquifer among ground water users.
In practice, however, the correlative rights doctrine in California is
part of the legal basis for integrating the use of ground water and
imported surface water supplies, not a policy for restricting ground

L

31. See id. at 930-35.
32. Contrast this with the administrative regulation of oil and gas production for the
benefit of all overlying owners discussed supra note 15. The common law doctrine of absolute
ownership is essentially the law of capture, giving each landowner all the oil, gas, or water he
is capable of pumping before it is withdrawn by another overlying owner. The legislative imposition of the unitization theory (requiring proportional sharing of the profits of oil or gas production among all overlying owners) protects all overlying landowners from the disproportionate withdrawals by any single overlying owner. The common law version, however, provides no
such protection.

514

UNIVERSITY O F COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53

water use if mining occurs.8s
Appropriation states vary in their approaches to ground water
mining. In theory, conflicts between ground water appropriators are
resolved by requiring the junior appropriator to stop withdrawah
when they interfere with those of senior appropriators. Similarly, restricting new appropriations when they may interfere with existing
ground water appropriators may protect existing ground water users.
Neither approach, however, will necessarily prevent ground water
mining.

Because of the inadequacy of traditional ground water law doctrines (which are basically modifications of surface water law doctrines) to deal with ground water,s4 several western states have enacted "critical area" legislation authorizing special ground water
regulations in designated critical areas.s6 The general objectives ,of
such legislation are to slow or stop ground water mining, to resolve
administratively well interference conflicts, and to protect existing
irrigation-based e c o n ~ r n i e s . ~ ~
Designating critical ground water areas is typically a state respon~ibility,~~
although designation procedures may be initiated by
33. See infra notes 60-62 and the accompanying text.
34. For a discussion of the physical differences between surface and ground water occurrence and their implicatons for water allocation policies, see Aiken, supra note 22. a t 920-21.
35. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 45-401 to -415; COLO. REV. STAT. 37-90-102 (1974);
IDAHOCODE 5 42-233a (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1036 (Supp. 1979); MONT.
REV.CODESANN. 8 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV.STAT.
$ 46-656 (Reissue 1978); NEV.
REV. STAT. 5 534.020 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. $ 75-11-13 (3968); OR. REV. STAT. 5
537.735 (1979); TEX.WATERCODEANN.tit. 2, 5 52-021 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WASH.REV.
CODEANN.§ 90.44.130 (1962); WYO.STAT.5 41-129 (Supp. 1975). New Mexico also authorizes regulation of ground water in artesian basins and formation of artesian conservancy districts. N.M. STAT.ANN.$5 75-12-2 to -13-1 (1968). States without some critical area legislation are California, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Utah. Oklahoma legislation
authorizing special ground water regulation in designated areas was hbsequently repealed.
See 3 W. HUTCHINS,supra note 23, a t 437-39; Rarick, Oklahoma Water Lrrw, Ground or
Percolating in the Pre-1971 Period, 24 OKLA.L. REV.403 (1971).
36. ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. 9 45-401(A) (Supp 1981); IDAHOCODE5 42-233a (Supp.
1979); TEX. WATERCODEANN. tit. 2, $ 52.117 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. 5 90.44.130 (1962).
37. ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN., $8 45.412 to -414; COLO. REV. STAT.5 37-90106(1)(1974); IDAHOCODE 5 42-233a (Supp. 1979); KAN. STAT.ANN. 5 82a-1038 (Supp.
1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 5 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. 46658(a)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV.REV.STAT.5 534.030(2)(1973); N.M. STAT.ANN. 5 75-1113 (1968); OR. REV.STAT.5 537-730 (1979); WASH.REV.CODEANN. 5 90.44.130 (1968);
WYO.STAT.$ 42-129(b)(Supp. 1975).
Texas takes the unique approach of establishing ground water controls through the forma-

0
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either state officialss8 or upon the petition of local ground water
users.8BCriteria for designating critical areas vary considerably and
include: (1) withdrawals approaching or exceeding an aquifer's "safe
yield" or recharge,'O (2) ground water level declines," (3) conflicts
between ground water users,4a (4) water quality degradation,'= and
(5) land subsidence." The ground water controls authorized in critical areas also vary considerably and include: (1) requiring state permits for new wells;46 (2) restricting ground water development
through permit denials,'' well spacing requirements," or well drilling morat~ria;'~
and (3) reducing ground water withdrawals by ention of underground water conservation districts. TEX. WATERCODE ANN, tit. 2, § 52.021
(Vernon Supp. 1979). State officials do not have a significant role in ground water policy
development and implementation.
38. ARIZ. REV.STAT.ANN. 46.412 (Supp. 1981); COLO. REV.STAT. 37-90-106(1)
(1974); IDAHOCODE8 42-233a (Supp. 1979); KAN.STAT.ANN. 82a-1036 (Supp. 1979);
MONT. REV. CODESANN. § 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEV. REV. STAT.$ 534.030(2) (1973);
N.M. STAT.
ANN. 5 75-11-13 (1968); OR. REV.STAT.$ 537.730 (1979); WASH.REV. CODE
5 41-129(b) (Supp. 1975). Texas and Nebraska are the
ANN.5 90.44.130 (1968); WYO.STAT.
only states in which ground water controls cannot be initiated by state officials.
ANN. 82a- 1036 (Supp.
39. ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN.5 45-4 15 (Supp 198 1); KAN.STAT.
1979); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 8 89-2914 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46658(3)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV.REV.STAT.§ 534.030(1) (1973); OR. REV.STAT.$ 537-730
(1979); TEX. WATERCODE ANN. tit. 2, $ 52.021 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WASH.REV. CODE
ANN. 5 90.44.130 (1968); WYO. STAT. 41-132 (Supp. 1975).
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. 5 45-412(1) (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a1036(b)(Supp. 1979); MONT.REV.CODESANN. !j 89-2914(1)(Supp. 1977); OR. REV.STAT.
3
537.730(3)(1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
90.44.130 (1968); WYO. STAT.§ 41129(a)(i)(Supp. 1975).
41. KAN.STAT.
A N N . 82a-1036(a)(Supp. 1975); OR. REV.STAT.§ 537.730(1)(1979);
WYO. STAT. 49-129(a)(ii)(Supp. 1975).
42. NEB. REV. STAT. 46-658(l)(a)(Cum, Supp. 1980); MONT.REV. CODESANN. 8
89-2914(3)(Supp. 1977); OR. REV. STAT. 3 537-720(2) (1979); WYO. STAT.
41129(a)(iii)(Supp. 1975).
43. ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. 45-412(3) (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. 82a1036(d)(Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. 537-730 (1979).
44. ARIZ. REV. STAT.ANN. 3 45-412(2) (SUPP. 1981).
45. Coto. REV. STAT.j! 37-90-107 (1974 & Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. 46659(1)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV.STAT.
5 534.050 (1975); TEX.WATERCODEANN.tit.
2, 52.1 14 (Vernon 1972).
46. COLO. REV..STAT.8 37-90-107 (1974 & Supp. 1979); IDAHOCODE 42-233a
(Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. 533.370(4), 534.1 10(3) (1973).
47. NEB,REV.STAT.8 46+666(l)(c)(Cum. Supp. 1980); TEX.WATERCODEANN.tit. 2,
52.117 (Vernon Supp. 1979); WYO. STAT. 41-132(a)(v)(Supp. 1975).
4648. KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 82a-1038(b)(l)(Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT.
666(4)(Cum. Supp. 1980); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 534.110(7) (1973); OR. REV. STAT. 8
537.730(1)(1979); WYO. STAT.5 41-132(a)(i)(Supp. 1975). Arizona does not establish a well
drilling moratorium per se, but additional land cannot be irrigated in "irrigation non-expansion areas," in "active management areas," and during the consideraton of whether an active
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forcing priorities,'@ reducing presently authorized withdrawalsPOrotating withdrawal^,^^ enforcing voluntary pumping agreementsPa and
purchasing and retiring ground water pumping rights.68
The difficulty of obtaining reliable informaton about ground
water availability significantly affects the development of ground
water policies including determining whether the critical area restrictions described above should be implemented. Information about
surface water availability can be obtained by observing and measuring streamflow which greatly simplifies the task of surface water administration. Information about ground water availability, however,
is not so easily obtained. The typical sources are geologic data from
test hole drilling for oil and gas, and well logs from oil, gas, and
water well installation. From these data, geologists can construct the
geologic profile of an area which will include the location and general character of ground water aquifers.
These data typically are not available for analysis, nor are they
geologically analyzed, until significant water well installation has occurred. This has important implications for the development of critical area ground water controls. Water rights in the West are typically administered on a complaint basis; state water officials will not
administratively regulate water users unless a complaint if filed,
often informally, by a senior appropriator. Ground water development will occur freely, subject, of course, to ground water availability, unless senior appropriators complain. If no complaints are made,
ground water management concerns will not develop until irrigators
begin to notice that water levels in their wells are falling. This may
not occur for many years after ground water development has
started. Water level declines are likely to lead to the formal monitoring of water levels on a regional basis to determine whether ground
management area should be designated. ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. $5 45-432, -452, -416 (Supp.
1981).
49. KAN.STAT.ANN. 5 82a-1038(b)(2)(Supp. 1979); MONT.REV.CODES
ANN. 5 892915(1)(Supp. 1977); N E V . REV. STAT. 8 534.110(6)(1978); OR. REV. STAT. $
537.730(a)(1979); WASH.REV.CODEANN.8 90.44.130 (1962); WYO.STAT. 41-132(a)(ii),
-l32(a)(iii)(Supp. 1975).
50. ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. $8 45-541 to -545, -563 (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT.ANN. 5
82a-I038(b)(3)(Supp. 1979); NEB.REV.STAT.5 46-666(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1980); OR. REV.
STAT.$ 537.730(4)(1979).
51. KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 82a-1036(b)(4)(Supp. 1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 46666(l)(b)(Cum. Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. 5 537-730(5)(1979); WYO. STAT. § 41132(a)(iv)(Supp. 1975).
52. OR. REV.STAT.5 537.735 (l979); WYO. STAT.5 41-132(c) (Supp. 1975).
53. ARIZ.REV.STAT.ANN. 5 45-566(A)(6), -567(A)(6) (Supp. 1981).
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water mining is occurring or whether ground water level declines are
a local phenomenon only. The significant point, however, is that serious ground water data collection may begin only after ground water
users have noticed that ground water level declines have begun.
Once geologic investigations (which may range in detail and sophistication from ground water level decline maps to computer projections of aquifer conditions for the next fifty years) have established
the existence of ground water mining, irrigators may initiate voluntary water conservation efforts to improve irrigation efficiency, and
state officials may establish control area regulations." In the absence
of such information, however, irrigation water management or control area regulations are unlikely to be developed.
The importance of ground water data as a prerequisite to effective ground water regulaton and management efforts cannot be overstated, In the parallel surface water situation, user conflicts can easily be documented by gauging whether sufficient water is flowing
past a senior appropriator's point of diversion. If not, the withdrawals of upstream junior appropriators are restricted until the senior
appropriator's needs have been satisfied. Streamflow can be depleted
temporarily by appropriators, but this will last only until the next
rain or until stored water is released from surface water reservoirs.
The ground water situation is much different. There is typically little
information regarding how much ground water is available, although
annual ground water level declines can be documented through
ground water level monitoring programs. This lag between the occurrence of ground water mining and the development of the necessary information for informed ground water regulation and management efforts ensures that mining problems will worsen before
management efforts are instituted. This delay will make those management efforts more difficult to implement because less ground
water and correspondingly fewer management options will be
available.
Ground water controls are not usually embraced by irrigators.
Development restrictions are favored by existing irrigators because
their pumping rights will be protected from potential competitors.
Development restrictions will be opposed by potential ground water
54. Control area regulations may also be initiated when ground water users complain
about well interference conflicts. Before ground water regulations are imposed, however, state
water officials typically will require some documentation that well interference conflicts are
actually occurring (e.g., to establish that the failure of a well is related to water level changes
caused by well pumping rather than being caused by mechanical failure of the pump, clogging
of the well casing, etc.) before administrative action will be taken.
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users who correctly argue that they are being regulated for the benefit of those who caused the mining problem in the first place. Use
restrictions are also unpopular with irrigators who perceive them as
threats to their economic livelihood, but this view ignores two facts.
First, considerable room for improvement in irrigation efficiency is
usually possible without substantial increases in irrigation costs.66
Second, if withdrawals are not reduced through regulation, they ultimately will be reduced because of reduced aquifer capacity. The issue is whether regulation to extend aquifer life is preferable to
forced reductions in withdrawals because of increased pumping
costs, reduced aquifer capacity, or both.
Ground water regulations are not a popular way to deal with
ground water mining, at least among ground water users. The degree
of political and economic sacrifice necessary to implement ground
water controls ensures that they will not be embraced by irrigators.
The more popular and politically palatable approach for dealing with
ground water mining is to augment existing water supplies. This alternative is particularly appealing if the cost of developing additional
supplies will be federally subsidized.
States have traditionally encouraged irrigation development,
first by developing water laws protecting irrigation water usesse and
later by authorizing the organization of irrigation and reclamation
distri~ts.'~
Reclamation districts typically are organized to facilitate
development of federal reclamation projects. Reclamation districts
also usually have the authority to levy property taxes against land
within the district and to issue bonds. This financial authority would
enable reclamation districts to develop surface water storage projects
in.the absence of federal subsidies if the projects were economically
feasible or if state or local taxpayers could be persuaded to subsidize
the costs of project development.
Supply augmentation related to ground water mining has been
implemented on a large scale in southern California where imported
Colorado River water has been made available for municipal and
agricultural purposes through the federal Colorado River Project.
Arizona and Texas are now attempting to obtain federal rescue
55. See Aiken, The National Water Policy Review and Western Water Rights L a w Reform. 59 NEB.L. REV. 327,.329-33 (1980).
56. See generally Trelease, Law, Water and People: The Role of Water h w in Conserving and Developing Natural Resources in the West, 18 W Y O .L.J. 3 (1963).
5 7 . See generally 4 R. CLARK,WATERAND WATERRIGHTS$8 340-46 (1970).
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projects to cope with ground water mining. Because California is the
prototype for western states in dealing with ground water mining
through developing imported surface water supplies, the California
experience will be briefly recounted.68
Because local ground water supplies have been inadequate to
meet growing municipal and agricultural water needs, Los Angeles
has imported surface water to augment native supplies for over seventy years. The first source of supplemental water was the Owens
Valley. Surface water was imported to Los Angeles from the Sierra
Nevada mountains through the 250 mile Los Angeles Aqueduct,
completed in 1913. Although Los Angeles financed construction of
most of the aqueduct and storage facilities, Owens Valley water was
initially used for irrigation in the San Fernando Valley. Los Angeles
was subsequently required to purchase irrigated land to obtain the
Owens Valley water it had originally developed.
The second major source of supplemental water for Los Angeles
is the Colorado River. As early as 1901, Colorado River water was
imported to the Imperial Valley through the Imperial Canal for irrigation. Irrigation interests subsequently persuaded the federal Bureau of Reclamation to study the importation of Colorado River
water to southern California. In 1921, the Bureau recommended
construction of Hoover Dam in Boulder Canyon fo; flood control,
water supply, and hydropower generation. The Bureau also recommended construction of a canal to deliver Colorado River Water to
Imperial Valley irrigators. In 1922, Secretary of State Herbert Hoover met with the seven Colorado River basin states to negotiate an
interstate compact apportioning Colorado River water between Upper Basin states (Colorado, Utah and Wyoming) and Lower Basin
states (Arizona, California, Nevada and New Mexico). Arizona refused to sign the initial compact proposal, correctly concluding that
California water development would prevent Arizona from acquiring
as much Colorado River water as it would prefer. A six state Colorado River Compact, excluding Arizona, was executed in 1925, allocating 7.5 million acre feet (maf) per year each to the Upper and
58. For a discussion of water development efforts in southern California, see E. COOPER,
AQUEDUCT
EMPIRE
(1968). Regarding the controversial Colorado River Project, see R . H .
BOYLE,J . GROVES
& T. WATKINS,
THEWATERHUSTLERS
134-201 (1971); B. HOLMES.
HISTORY OF FEDERAL
WATERRESOURCES
PROGRAMS
A N D POLICIES.
1961-70 53-60 (United
States Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1379, 1979); Trelease, Arizona v. CafiJornia: AIlocation
of Water Resources to the People, States and Nation, 1963 SUP.CT. REV.158; Meyers, The
Colorado River, 19 STAN.L. REV.1 (1966); Hanks, Peace West of the 98th Meridian - A
Solution to FederalState Conflicts over Western Waters, 23 RUTGERS
L. REV.33 ( I 968).
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Lower Basin states. Up to one maf of any annual surplus above
fifteen maf could be appropriated by Lower Basin states. The Compact did not apportion water among the Lower Basin states. For this
reason, Arizona did not ratify the compact until 1944 when it pursued construction of the Central Arizona Project.
The Compact was ratified by Congress in the Boulder Canyon
Project Act of 1928.68The Act required California to limit its annual consumption to 4.4 maf plus half of any surplus available to the
Lower Basin states. The Act was passed in part because Los Angeles
successfully integrated irrigation and municipal water interests to
support the Act. Los Angeles, in 1923, proposed that a second dam,
Imperial Dam, and canal, the All-American Canal, be constructed to
deliver Colorado River water to irrigators. Los Angeles also organized the Metropolitan Water District, representing municipal water
districts from thirteen southern California cities, to support the Act
and the Colorado River Project. The combined irrigation and urban
interests were successful in obtaining passage of the Boulder Canyon
Project Act which authorized the federal construction of Hoover
Dam, Imperial Dam, and the All-American Canal. Parker Dam was
subsequently authorized to complete the Colorado River Project, In
1931, voters within the Metropolitan Water District authorized construction of the Colorado River Aqueduct to deliver Colorado River
water to the Los Angeles region. Construction of Hoover Dam began
in 1931 and was cgmpleted in 1935. Parker Dam and Imperial Dam
were completed in 1938. The Colorado River Aqueduct and the AllAmerican Canal were completed in 1939 and 1940, respectively. Total project costs exceeded $400 million.
The availability of supplemental water has led to the integrated
use of imported surface water and native ground water in southern
C a l i f ~ r n i aThis
. ~ ~ includes the use of underground storage capacity
created by ground water mining to store imported surface water underground. California Supreme Court decisions have facilitated the
evolution of these integrated use policies by recognizing an exclusive
right of ground water recharge entities to control withdrawals of
. ~ ~rights to withdraw ground water are
water stored u n d e r g r o ~ n d If
59. 45 Stat. 1057 (1928), amended by 43 U.S.C. 5 617 (Supp. I V 1980).
60. See Aiken, supra note 22, at 934-35.
61. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal.2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943); City of
Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal.2d 199, 537 P.2d 1250 (1975). Regarding Glendale see Kreiger & Banks, Groundwater Basin Management, 50 CALIF.
L. REV.56 (1962).
Regarding San Fernando, see Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground, 5 ECOLOGYL.Q. 625
(1976).
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judicially determined and withdrawals limited to each user's proportionate share of the aquifer's "safe yield," recharge entities can
charge water users for any ground water withdrawn in excess of the
safe yield allocation. The safe yield adjudication process essentially
establishes that any ground water withdrawn in excess of the safe
yield allocation is recharged ground water for which the recharge
entity is entitled to be paid.62
The development of effective institutions for integrating the use
of supplemental surface water with native ground water supplies is
an important water management technique. The attractiveness of
this innovation should not obscure, however, that southern California
ground water users have thus far managed to avoid water supply
restrictions resulting from regulation of ground water development
and use largely because of federally subsidized interstate surface
water transfers.
Arizona is experiencing water supply problems similar to California's. Irrigation and agriculture are competing for diminishing
ground water supplies. Because of irrigation and municipal demands,
ground water in Arizona is being mined at a rate of over two million
acre feet (maf) per year.B3 The proposed Bureau of Reclamation
Central Arizona Project (CAP) would divert approximately 1.2 maf
of Colorado River water to the Tuscon and Phoenix areas to provide
water for irrigation and municipal purposes. Although Arizona originally opposed the federal Colorado River Project, it ratified the Colorado River Compact in 1944 to pursue development of the CAP.
Congressional authorization of the CAP was delayed, however, because of legal uncertainty regarding whether Arizona had title to
sufficient water under the Compact for the project. To clarify its
Compact water entitlements, Arizona sued California in 1952. In the
1963 decision, Arizona v. Calif~rnia,~'the U . S . Supreme Court
ruled in favor of Arizona, which means that Los Angeles will lose
approximately one maf if and when the CAP is constructed. While
part of the CAP has been constructed, additional congressional funding authorizations are needed to complete the project.
The potentially most grandiose federal rescue project, proposing
to import Missouri River water principally to the Texas panhandle,
is the subject of the ongoing High Plains Study. Texas is second only
62. Regarding ground water recharge policies of other western states, see Aiken, supra
note 22, at 935.
supra note 58, at 57.
63. B. HOLMES,
64. 373 U.S.546 (1963).
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to California in the amount of ground water withdrawn and the
number of acres irrigated. Ten maf of ground water were withdrawn
in Texas in 1975, compared to eighteen maf in Calif~rnia.'~Irrigation from the Ogallala aquifer in the Texas high plains, the panhandle region, began in the 1 9 3 0 ' ~ High
. ~ ~ plains water levels began to
fall in the 1940's. State legislation authorized the formation of
ground water conservation district^,^^ some of which have (1) restricted ground water development through well-spacing requirements and (2) indirectly restricted withdrawals through irrigation
runoff control requirements.'j8 The first state water development
planee concluded in 1966 (1) that intrastate water importation to
western Texas would be insufficient to continue high plains irrigation
and (2) that federally subsidized water importation from the Mississippi, Missouri, or Columbia rivers would allow high plains irrigation
to stabilize or expand. These conclusions were included in the 1968
Texas Water Plan.7o Texas has opted to pursue implementation of
its water plan rather than impose ground water restrictions.
In 1976 Texas cooperated with other southern high plains
states, particularly Oklahoma, in persuading Congress to authorize
the High Plains Study (HPS)to study water importation to the high
plains regiona71The authorization foj the study, however, reflects
that some political compromises were necessary to obtain congressional approval. The justifications for the study are "to assure an
adequate supply of food to the Nation" and "to promote the emnomic vitality of the High Plains R e g i ~ n . "Study
~ ~ objectives are "to
study the depletion of the natural resources of [the states using] declining [sic] water resources of the Ogallala aquifer" and "to develop plans to increase water supplies in the area and report thereon
to Congress, together with any recommendations for further congressional action."73 The study must "examine the feasibility of various
alternatives to provide adequate water supply [sic] in the area in65. C. MURRAY
& E. REEVES,
supra note 1, at 24-25.
66. Regarding irrigation and water development activities in Texas see R. BOYLE.J.
GROVES
& T. WATKINS,
supra note 58, at 18-129.
67. TEX.
WATERCODEANN.art. 2, 8 52.021 (Vernon 1972).
68. See G . SLOGGETT,
supra note 18, at 1 1 .
69. State water planning has been used principally to identify where federal reclamation
and flood control projects should be constructed. See Aiken, supra note 55, at 343-44.
70. R. BOYLE,
J. GROVES,
& T. WATKINS,
supra note 58, at 50-62.

71. Pub. L. No. 94-587, $ 193, 90 Stat. 2943 (1976), codified at 42 U.S.C. 5 1962618
(1976), partially reprinted supra, note 17.
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id.
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cluding, but not limited to, the transfer of water from adjacent areas
. . . to assure the continued economic growth and vitality of the region."I4 The study must include an evaluation of the costs and benefits of various actions and the costs of inaction. In evaluating water
transfer options, existing water rights and future water needs of all
affected areas must be considered.
The apparent congressional intent suggests that (1) the economic vitality of the region as a whole is the primary concern rather
than the economic vitality of individual states within the region; (2)
depletion of oil and gas reserves in the region is a valid ?factor for
consideration; (3) sources of supplemental water could include the
Missouri River but not the Columbia River; (4) future water needs
of the exporting and importing basins should be considered equally
(i.e., no protection for basin of origin); and (5) environmental concerns, not mentioned in the study authorization, probably are
subordinate to economic development concerns.
The Economic Development Administration (EDA) of the
United States Department of Commerce is responsible to Congress
for implementing the study. Because the six high plains states (Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Texas) are
responsible for conducting the study and have a stake in the outcome, administration of the study is governed by the High Plains
Study C ~ u n c i l Council
.~~
membership includes the governors of the
high plains states, three other representatives from each state (usually water rights officials, water planning officials, and state legislators), and EDA representatives. Each state has equal Council representation, making study domination by any single state difficult.
The HPS will examine six alternative development strategies:
(1) baseline (no change), (2) voluntary and mandatory water use
restrictions, (3) local water supply augmentation, (4) intrastate
water transfers, (5) interstate water transfers, and ( 6 ) nonagricultural development options. The baseline and interstate transfers are
the only alternatives for which published informaton is available.
The baseline scenario represents what would happen from 1977
to 2020 if the status quo were maintained: i.e., no new ground water
regulations, supplemental water supply projects, or technological in74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. The source of information about HPS study administration and the baseline results
is High Plains Study Council, Six-State High Plains-Ogallala Aquifer Resources Study: Congressional Briefing /Paper] (February 25, 1981). The congressional briefing paper is the only
official HPS report issued to date.
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novations. The baseline scenario assumes, however, that irrigation
water use efficiency will improve considerably during the study period. Increasing irrigation costs are projected to give irrigators sufficient private economic incentives to adopt improved irrigation practices and technologies currently available. Irrigated crop prices are
projected to increase in real terms, discounted for inflation, but not
as rapidly as during the past decade. Increases in United States population and, more importantly, increases in agricultural exports are
the primary reasons crop prices are expected to increase. The baseline scenario also evaluates regional oil and gas production.
The baseline results indicate that annual regional ground water
withdrawals are projected to decline from twenty-two rnaf in 1977 to
twenty rnaf in 2020. The number of acres irrigated is projected to
increase, however, from twelve million to 13.5 million. The annual
economic value of irrigated production is projected to increase from
$4.5 billion to eleven billion, primarily because of increased crop
prices. Annual natural gas production is projected to decrease from
5.5 billion cubic feet to 0.5 billion cubic feet. Annual oil production
is also projected to decrease from 500 million barrels to fifty million
barrels. The annual economic value of oil and gas production is projected to increase from0$3.5billion in 1977 to a peak of five billion in
2000 but is projected to decline to $1.5 billion in 2020.
The regional irrigation aggregates, projecting a net increase in
the value of irrigated production, mask a substantial regional shift in
the location of irrigation. Annual ground water withdrawals for irrigation are projected to decrease by nine percent by 2020. Most of
the decrease will occur in Texas and Kansas, with an increase occurring in Nebraska. Annual ground water withdrawals in Texas are
projected to decrease from eight rnaf to 4.8 maf, a forty percent reduction. Annual ground water withdrawals in Kansas are projected
to decrease from three rnaf to 0.3 maf, a ninety percent reduction.
Annual ground water withdrawals in Nebraska are projected,-to increase from eight rnaf to thirteen maf, a sixty percent increa~e.'~
The corresponding losses of irrigated acres in Texas and Kansas will
be more than balanced by the increase in irrigation in Nebraska.
Texas and Kansas are also likely to lose livestock feeding operations
to Nebraska. Approximately six million acres will revert to dryland
production, while additional acres will be only partially irrigated.
The baseline results suggest that regional economic vitality will
76. Annual ground water withdrawals in Colorado, New Mexico and Oklahoma are projected to average approximately one rnaf throughout the study period.
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improve during the next forty years. The annual regional value of
oil, gas, and irrigated production will increase from eight billion to
$12.5 billion. If Nebraska were excluded from the region, however,
the remaining high plains states would suffer a decline in the value
of annual oil, gas, and irrigated production.
Interstate water transfers were evaluated by the United States
Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps identified four possible water
importation alternatives, primarily from the Missouri and Arkansas
rivers.77 The annual cost of imported surface water averages $600
per acre foot, several times what an irrigator could afford to pay.
Implementation of any importation option would require a substantial subsidy.
The HPS resolution indicated two justifications for the study:
maintaining an adequate food supply to the nation and maintaining
the economic vitality of the high plains region. The baseline results
indicate that regional crop production will increase, although exports
and food prices will be higher. This suggests that United States food
supplies will certainly be adequate, if somewhat more expensive. Regional economic vitality will also improve, although most of the increase in irrigated production will occur in Nebraska. If Nebraska
were excluded, the rest of the region would decline economically,
based on reductions in irrigation, oil, and gas production. Water importation to maintain irrigation in Texas and Kansas would require
federal subsidies of up to $91 billion for construction, plus annual
federal operation and maintenance subsidies of up to $13 billion.
Federal subsidies of this magnitude cannot be justified on the basis
of protecting either the nation's food supplies or the economic vitality of the high plains region. Whether subsidies of this magnitude
are politically feasible during what may be a period of federal budg77. The Corps evaluated two alternatives for each route, a lower-cost, lower-volume option with a higher cost per acre foot of water delivered, and a higher-cost, higher-volume
option with a lower cost per acre foot of water delivered. The first option would import 2.1 maf
and 6.4 maf of Missouri River water from South Dakota to southwest Nebraska, northeast
Colorado, and western Kansas at an annual average cost of $410 and $340, respectively. The
second option would import one and six maf of Missouri River water from Missouri to western
Kansas at an annual average cost of $880 and $352 per acre foot, respectively. The third
option would import two maf and 6.8 maf of water principally from the Arkansas River in
Arkansas to the northern Texas high plains at an annual average cost of $752 and $482 per
acre foot respectively. The fourth option would import 2.4 maf and 7.2 maf of water from the
Arkansas, Ouachita, Red, Sabine, and Sulfur rivers in Arkansas and Texas to the Texas high
plains at an average annual cost of $785 and $695 per acre foot, respectively. These costs do
not include the cost of delivering imported water to irrigators. These water distribution costs
are probably the only costs the irrigators are likely to undertake themselves, acting collectively
through an irrigation or reclamation district.
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etary austerity remains to be seen, but it seems ~nlikely.'~If a federal high plains rescue project is not launched, establishing ground
water controls or improvements in irrigation efficiency may yet extend the life of ground water supplies in the high plains region. If
not, Texas and Kansas will suffer the consequences of not imposing
ground water controls to extend the life of ground water supplies.

IV. POLICYALTERNATIVES
Although ground water mining is slowly documented, it is a forseeable and inevitable consequence of extensive ground water development for irrigation and other high-volume uses. The basic questions for policy makers are whether to act or do nothing. General
policy options include restricting ground water development or use,
and supply augmentation.
Ground water restrictions are unpopular but essentially only require legally what reduced aquifer capacity would ultimately require
physically: reduced ground water use.70 Irrigation restrictions may
be evaulated in different phases: (1) irrigation runoff controls, (2)
irrigation scheduling, and (3) water quantity restriction^.^^ Reducing
irrigation runoff is not difficult or expensive to accomplish and typically can be effected by capturing runoff in irrigation reuse pits for
subsequent reuse. Runoff controls reduce ground water withdrawals
for irrigation but also affect irrigation return flows. If the runoff
would have percolated back into the aquifer, runoff controls may
have little effect on net ground water withdrawals, although irrigators pumping costs will be reduced. If the runoff would have returned to a stream, runoff controls will reduce the water that would
otherwise have been available to downstream water users. Irrigation
scheduling, the next step in reducing irrigation water use, requires
field monitoring of crop water needs and application of irrigation
water only when natural precipitation is insufficient. Irrigation
scheduling may be more expensive to implement than runoff controls
and requires better water management by the irrigator. Net ground
water withdrawals may be reduced somewhat to the extent crop
78. In addition, use of water from the upper Missouri River would be subject t'o existing
use for navigation, Indian water rights, and potential use for energy development. Proposals to
implement any of the transfer options would lead to interstate political conflicts over which
state is allocated what quantity of water in addition to any funding controversies.
79.' For a general discussion of ground water development and use restrictions see Aiken
& Supalla, Ground Water Mining and Western Water Rights Law: The Nebraska Experience,
24 S.D.L.REV.607, 629-40 (1979).
80. For a general discussion of legal aspects of improving water use efficiency see Aiken,
supra note 55, at 329-33.
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water use and evaporation are reduced. Significant reductions in
ground water withdrawals and a corresponding increase in aquifer
life will not occur, however, until ground water withdrawals are restricted to the extent that irrigators are required either to change
cropping patterns to include crops requiring less water or to reduce
irrigated acreage. At this point, the value of irrigated production
may be adversely affected, but the life of ground water supplies is
more likely to be significantly increased.
The important issue relative to ground water controls is whether
the cost of administering regulations and any economic benefits postponed due to ground water controls are outweighed by the future
economic benefits achieved by extending aquifer life. Irrigation runoff controls and irrigation scheduling will reduce gross ground
water withdrawals but may not have a significant effect on net
ground water withdrawals. Ground water withdrawal restrictions,
leading to growing crops requiring less water or a reduction of irrigated acreage, may reduce current economic benefits from irrigation,
but those benefits will be sustained for a longer period.
Supply augmentation may be subsidized or unsubsidized. Federal subsidies are undesirable for two reasons: (1) there appears to
be no national benefit from subsidizing irrigation in the West, and
(2) federal rescue efforts reduce state and local incentives to control
ground water use. Federal reclamation policy originally developed as
a ineans to encourage settlement of the western frontier.81 Federal
irrigation water was provided to give homesteaders the means to settle and "reclaim" the arid West. The reclamation program received
its greatest impetus during the Depression, when it was perceived, as
were other public works programs, as a means of creating needed
jobs. While the settlement and employment aspects of the federal
reclamation program were sufficient justifications in earlier cicumstances, both fail as adequate justifications for continued federal subsidy of rescue projects today.
In addition to their cost, a further disadvantage of federal rescue projects is that they in effect reward areas that fail to control
ground water mining. Continued provision of subsidized irrigation
water will not encourage irrigators or states to control ground water
use but will encourage ground water mining.
While federal subsidies through rescue projects are undesirable,
81. For a general discussion of the historical evolution of federal reclamation policy see
B. HOLMES,A History of Federal Water Resources Programs, 1800-1960 (United States
Dep't of Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1233, 1972).
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state or local subsidies may be more appropriate. After the irrigators, local and state economies benefit most from irrigation development. The existence of this economic benefit may enable irrigators to
persuade local residents or state legislators to authorize reclamation
bonds to construct supplemental water supply projects if ground
water mining occurs. If irrigators fail to persuade others that the
economic benefits from irrigation are worth protecting through state
or local subsidy, perhaps those benefits are not as great as originally
,perceived. In any event, the difficulty of obtaining a state or local
subsidy to provide a supplemental water supply may make irrigators
more willing to consider ground water controls as means of dealing
with ground water mining.

